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Preliminary Draft

22 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Discussion of IDEALIST Program by DOD and
BOB at November ExCom Meeting

REFERENCE:

1. Recently several formal documents and informal conversations ~~between knowledgeable persons~~ indicated that a very real possibility exists that both the DOD and the BOB will discuss the subject of the continuation of the IDEALIST Program. In fact, the BOB ~~has~~ announced at the 1967 and 1968 Budget Hearings that they would make a point of discussing the IDEALIST Program in depth, with the aim of determining whether this Program is worthy of continuation. With indications of this type, it well behooves CIA to be prepared ~~in depth~~ to not only discuss the IDEALIST Program, but to have undeniable proofs that a very valid requirement still exists for continuation of this Program. *at November ExCom meeting*

2. A discussion of this subject must envision what allegations will be made by the BOB. N.B. There is no attempt to discuss the DOD position because this information is not available within the confines of OSA, but it is felt that a very strong case will be made for the continuation of the U-2 capability within the Air Force and a probable comment to the affect that their capabilities are equal to those of the IDEALIST Program. A review of the

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probable comments by BOB reveals that most of them are petty, biased, and without fact; but are also very difficult to counter. Some suggested comments by BOB are as follows:

- a. The Program costs too much vs. the results attained.
- b. The DOD can do it just as easily.
- c. Two units, CIA and DOD, mean double cost with double expense.
- d. The IDEALIST Program has very little operational flying time per year and has flown very ^{few} little missions.
- e. The IDEALIST Program could continue with a ~~lot~~ fewer airplanes and could do the same job they are doing now.

3. One can readily see that there is no substance to the generalities expressed above and historically, it is found that the BOB will make these allegations without fact and without valid backup material. CIA can ill afford to counter these comments with prattle such as: CIA does not log its operational flying time as SAC; or we could have flown more missions but were held down by the State Department; or if you included the cost of the Blue Suit maintenance and supply, then the [REDACTED] would cost more than the IDEALIST. Rebuttals such as these would fall on deaf ears and would only involve the Agency in needless discussion of trivia.

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4. The Agency spokesmen would be better advised if they were armed with the "PRO" comments of accomplishments and capabilities rather than denials of obscure allegations. Items that fall~~l~~^u within this pervue^{ur} could be as listed below ^{and} with undoubted^{ly} ^{then are} additional items that could come to mind after a round table discussion.

- a. Present covert overflight authority.
- b. Acceptable cover story in case of incident
- c. Very high probability of survival^{in the enviro-}
^{to be planned} ~~would be realized.~~
- d. Established worldwide organization with quick reaction deployment capability.
- e. Established rapport with State Department, DOD, Foreign Governments, etc. 25X1X7
- f. Long standing [REDACTED] agreements which would be difficult to ab^{er}gate.
- g. Established development program for aircraft, sensors and ECM equipment.

5. The discussion points listed above could well be expanded ^t upon but ~~as~~^{the} ones chosen as the most valid and with the greatest impact on the ExCom and NRO requirements, should be developed as the basic thrust by the Agency spokesmen.

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6. Suggested OSA actions at this time may well include the following:

a. Insure that the spokesmen at the ExCom are provided "in depth" facts with basic logic.

b. Provide both a memorandum and a briefing for these spokesmen in ample time prior to the ExCom meeting so that guidance that may well be ^{received} ~~reserved~~ ^{that} ~~at this~~ time can be expanded upon and the resultants provided to this higher authority.

c. A round table discussion of the points and suggested actions should be held in the immediate future so that action officers may progress and provide the required data in sufficient time for digestion by Agency spokesmen.

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Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Special Activities

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